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Strategic Bias in Discrete Choice Experiments
June 5, 2018
Abstract
An induced value laboratory experiment is conducted to explore the vulnera-
bility of discrete choice experiments to strategic misrepresentation of preferences.
We consider strategic behaviour to arise when an agent: (i) believes the choice
experiment will be used to determine a provision decision over a discrete set of
alternatives; and (ii) has expectations about the relative likelihood of those alter-
natives being selected and delivered. In the experiment, agents receive induced
values for the discrete set of provisioning alternatives. In treatments where agents
receive information that their first best outcome is unlikely to win, we investigate
the extent to which their choices change, in a manner consistent with them seeking
to deliver their second best outcome in the provisioning decision. We find that
27% of respondents misrepresent their preferences and reveal evidence of strategic
bias. We find that this behaviour is sufficient to change inferences about preferred
provision at the aggregate level.
Keywords: Discrete choice experiments, strategic bias, provision rule, response strate-
gies
Strategic Bias in Discrete Choice Experiments
1 Introduction
Strategic bias has long been a concern in stated preference studies. The phenomenon
occurs when an individual “deliberately misrepresents their preferences in order to in-
fluence the decision making process” (Bennett and Blamey, 2001). Most of the research
regarding strategic bias has concerned the contingent valuation method, with very few
studies exploring whether, and to what extent, the bias might manifest itself in discrete
choice experiments (DCE).1
The main objective of this study is to examine strategic bias in discrete choice ex-
periments within a realistic representation of the end use of DCEs in a decision mak-
ing process. We conduct an induced value laboratory choice experiment that exhibits
essential characteristics of when strategic bias might occur in the field. First, respon-
dents believe an agency is deciding on a provision decision (e.g. yes/no development;
high/medium/low conservation); second, respondents’ choices in the DCE are used in
the provisioning decision; and finally, respondents anticipate that true preference reve-
lation will lead to a unfavourable provision outcome. To address the first element, we
present a set of possible provision outcomes to respondents. Additionally, we induce val-
ues for each of the outcomes, such that respondents know their preference ordering over
the provision outcomes. To address the second, respondents are told that the DCE will
be used to determine which provision outcome, and hence payoff, will occur. To address
the final element, some respondents are given information on the likelihood of each of the
provision outcomes being implemented. This final aspect reflects situations when indi-
viduals have expectations of the likely provision outcomes through, for example, media
outlets, opinion polls, social networks, etc.
We compare choice behaviour between those respondents who do, and do not, receive
information on the probabilities of the provision outcomes being implemented. We in-
vestigate the extent to which those who, in the expectation of an unfavourable outcome,
target a non-demand revealing option and misrepresent their unconditional preferences
in the DCE in order to deliver their second best outcome.
1See Hanley et al. (2001) for an overview and example of DCE.
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The final provision outcomes are each described in terms of attribute levels. Respon-
dents are told that the survey will first be used to evaluate their likes and dislikes over the
different attributes and then that information will be used to make a decision on which
provision outcome they prefer. More formally, the DCE choice data are used to estimate
marginal utilities for the attributes and calculate the choice probabilities for the prede-
fined provision outcomes. The provision outcomes are not seen as a choice set within
the DCE, in which case the task would revert to a simple referendum. As such, respon-
dents need to establish and use attribute-based decision rules consistent with whichever
provision outcome the respondent desires. The full set of DCE choice data are used to
determine which provision outcome (and hence payoff) will be provided.
Our experimental set up creates a challenging task for respondents, yet one we believe
has characteristics that allow for strategic behaviour found in the field. Despite the
complex task, we find a significant portion of respondents misrepresent their preferences
when faced with the likely implementation of an undesirable provision outcome. We
find evidence of the use of lexicographic heuristics by those opting to misrepresent their
preferences. Finally, we find that by misrepresenting their preferences agents were able
to influence the provision outcome, such that an outcome more favourable to them is
delivered.
In contingent valuation studies (e.g. Bohm (1972), Whittington et al. (1990), Wheeler
and Damania (2001), Taylor et al. (2001)) there is mixed evidence regarding the impact of
strategic behaviour. Motivation for strategic responses in this case, is driven by two types
of reasoning. The first occurs if the respondent thinks that the good will be provided
given substantial positive responses; however, in actuality they will be able to pay less
than their stated amount or someone else will pay for the service (Whittington et al.,
1990). In this case, respondents have incentive to overbid. The second reason is driven
by a respondent’s belief that the decision to provide the good has already been made
and the survey is aimed to elicit at what price the good should be provided (Carson
and Groves, 2007). In this consideration, a respondent has incentive to underbid. The
contingent valuation framework is such that it is possible for respondents to bias their
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responses because it may be easy to discern the research agenda and implement a strategy
in the open ended or dichotomous framework. Even when contingent valuation studies
are set up as an advisory referenda, responses may not always be incentive compatible if
a respondent believes that the survey will be inconsequential (Vossler and Watson, 2013;
Carson et al., 2014).
One of the (many) factors that prompted the widespread adoption of DCEs was that
the dominant stated preference method, contingent valuation, had some weaknesses which
DCEs were argued to be less vulnerable to. These included the scope for protest bidding
and strategic behaviour (Hanley et al., 2001). Bennett and Blamey (2001) argue there
are two main reasons as to why the DCE framework mitigates the possibility of strategic
responses. First, a choice experiment environment can hide the true purpose of the survey
and by asking respondents to make trade-offs between multiple attributes suggests certain
ambiguity regarding the optimal response strategy. Second, the repetitive nature of DCEs
provide an environment that is difficult to be consistently strategic. Despite the claims
put forth that DCEs are less susceptible to strategic behaviour than other valuation
techniques, there has been little testing of these assertions.
Carson and Groves (2007) argue that the DCE structure violates the Gibbard-Sattherwaite
necessary condition for incentive compatibility, by asking respondents multiple questions.
A response to this shortcoming is to stress consequentiality, which Carson and Groves
(2007) define as the agent caring about the outcome and believing that the results from
the survey will influence the decision making process. Using homegrown and induced
value experiments, previous literature has explored how to achieve incentive compatibil-
ity in DCEs (e.g. Collins and Vossler (2009), Taylor et al. (2010), Carson et al. (2015),
Interis et al. (2016)).2 One approach in the literature has been to randomly select one
choice set from the experimental design to be binding to achieve incentive compatibility.
In the binding set, a respondent is asked to pay for the good/bundle once the outcome
is determined by some provision rule (e.g. plurality or majority rule). While a useful
2Homegrown experiments use actual goods where values are known to individuals, while induced value
experiments use arbitrary goods where the good itself is worth nothing to a respondent except through
the value induced by the experimenter for the good.
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mechanism to achieve incentive compatibility, this approach does not reflect how DCE
data is used in practice. In practice, a single set from the experimental design would not
be chosen randomly and the relative popularity of the constituent options used to deter-
mine the provision outcome. Our approach seeks to move the consideration of strategic
bias closer to a more plausible use of DCE data, in which all choice data are aggregated,
is used to inform the provision outcome.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarises the literature on strate-
gic bias in discrete choice experiments. Section 3 outlines the experimental design and
testable hypotheses. Section 4 discusses the results from the experiment and Section 5
concludes the paper.
2 Literature Review
The DCE framework, which involves eliciting preferences for multi-attribute goods
by asking repeated discrete choice questions, makes DCEs susceptible to untruthful re-
sponses. The need for surveys to be seen as consequential allows for respondents to have
an incentive to misrepresent their preferences. This is driven by expectations about (i)
the provision rule and (ii) other subjects’ responses. Those in combination create an
environment where it is not always in one’s best interest to tell the truth. For example,
Carson and Groves (2007) highlight that in a simple plurality provision rule, an agent’s
best strategy is to pick between the two alternatives they believe to have the highest
probability of winning; this strategy may exclude an agent from ever choosing their most
preferred alternative.
Two main experimental approaches have been used to examine preference misrepre-
sentation. The first is to look at differences in homegrown values between hypothetical
and binding treatments. In this case, the binding treatment is theoretically incentive com-
patible and thus any deviations from the hypothetical treatments measure some degree
of bias (Vossler and Evans, 2009). A second approach is to look at differences between
choices when values are induced and therefore the true preferences of individuals are
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known. In both approaches, a common theme driving misrepresentation of preferences
is the stated provision rule. Carson and Groves (2007) state that in analysing consumer
responses, it is important to determine how a respondent believes the provision outcome
will be affected by their survey responses.3 Vossler and Evans (2009), Taylor et al. (2010)
and Vossler et al. (2012) use homegrown experiments to explore how changes to provi-
sion rules drive strategic misrepresentation of preferences when binding treatments are
compared to hypothetical ones. In all three studies, bias was defined as the difference in
willingness to pay (WTP) between the binding treatment with a simple majority provision
rule, i.e. respondents would actually pay at the end of the experiment, and treatments
where the provision rule was more opaque or hypothetical.
In Vossler and Evans (2009) participants respond to a referendum regarding a class-
room recycling programme. Using different treatments, respondents’ votes will either
(1) be binding and the outcome will be implemented through a majority vote provision
rule; (2) only advise an agency on the referendum outcome; (3) be completely hypothet-
ical; or, (4) be added to moderator votes. Bias was largest in the latter two treatments.
When participants’ votes correspond to only 25% of the deciding votes, and 75% of the
votes were by moderators, a respondent’s probability of influencing the referendum out-
come falls. Thus, when a respondent believes that all moderators will vote yes (no) the
provision rule is no longer incentive compatible. This highlights the need for agents to
believe their answers will actually affect the outcome. If agents anticipate having little
probability of influencing the agency’s decision, the incentive to tell the truth diminishes.
However, differing provision rules do not always lead to bias. Vossler et al. (2012) run
an experiment for a public tree planting programme. Respondents answer a DCE and are
told that one choice set will be randomly selected as binding. The experiment included
three real payment treatments and one hypothetical treatment. The real treatments gave
varying degrees of information on how responses in the binding choice set would influence
how the project would be implemented. In the hypothetical treatment respondents were
3Scheufele and Bennett (2012) argue that learning may also be an important driver of strategic
responses in DCEs. They conduct an online survey to test for strategic learning for a nature reserve.
They find that respondents are more cost sensitive as they progress through the multiple DCE questions.
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not given a provision rule, such that their choices were completely hypothetical and
they were simply told that results from the survey will be provided to the government.
Significant differences in WTP were observed only between the real and hypothetical
treatments. No significant difference was found in the real treatments which varied the
stated provision rule. This suggests that in the absence of a provision rule, bias tends
to be most apparent. These findings are supported by Taylor et al. (2010) who also find
that when provision rules have been explicitly mentioned, WTP is closest to the binding
treatment while bias is largest in the absence of a provision rule.
Deviations from true preference revelation are also strongly driven by a respondent’s
expectations about the choices and preferences of other participants (Carson and Groves,
2007). Vossler et al. (2012) directly investigate this phenomenon by asking respondents ex
post whether they considered the decisions of other participants. By doing so they create
a platform for identifying strategic respondents. However, they find little evidence of
strategic behaviour; few respondents indicated considering how others might vote. This
is likely due to an individual having little reason to expect that the preferences of others
will lead to an unfavourable tree planting project. As the survey gave no indication
regarding the preferences of others, it is not surprising that few respondents exhibited
strategic behaviour in this study.
Diverging from homegrown studies, we turn to induced value experiments where re-
searchers can clearly test the vulnerability of DCEs to strategic bias, because the true
preferences are known. In induced value experiments, the researchers can discern true
preferences from non-demand revealing preferences, i.e. those which deviate from the
induced values. Collins and Vossler (2009) run an induced value DCE where participants
receive value for arbitrary attributes and are presented with choice sets that vary the
levels of these attributes. Like the homegrown studies, one choice set is randomly se-
lected to be binding. Depending on the treatment, the provision rule determines which
alternative from the binding set is implemented. Deviations from induced preferences in
a choice set stem from (i) the provision rule, (ii) other respondents’ support for an option
and (iii) expectations about the decision makers’ preferences. Respondents knew that
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the values of other players might differ from their own values; however, the distribution
was unknown. Overall, there was little evidence of deviation from induced preferences
across all treatments. These findings differ from Luchini and Watson (2014) who, in a
simple posted-price provision rule (where respondents receive the option they selected in
the binding set), find only 2/3 of respondents make choices that are consistent with their
induced values. This may be due to the cognitive effort needed in Luchini and Watson
(2014) being more difficult; their study had four attributes including a cost attribute,
while Collins and Vossler (2009) had only one attribute and one cost attribute.
A similar study conducted by Carson et al. (2015) found that individuals chose options
that are not aligned with the induced values, over 10% of the time. Respondents were
given values for arbitrary attributes and presented with choice sets that vary the levels
of the attributes. Like Collins and Vossler (2009), one choice set is randomly selected to
be binding and using a plurality provision rule, whichever option has the most votes is
paid out to all individuals. They find that respondents usually cast these non-demand
revealing choices for the status-quo option, which was usually the second best alternative
in each choice set. They offer several explanations for this phenomenon. First, selecting
the status-quo option is due to loss aversion, i.e. respondents prefer the option that is
offered at zero cost. Second, computation errors in calculating marginal differences in
attributes may lead to non-demand revealing choices. Finally, selecting the second best
alternative, which happens to be the status-quo a significant portion of the time, is due
to an individual’s priors about the distribution of other participants’ preferences and not
a behavioural bias for the status-quo. Furthermore, when respondents continuously face
choice sets where many of the alternatives are bad outcomes (i.e. low monetary pay offs),
respondents gravitate toward the safety of the status-quo option, as the preferences of
others are unknown and could result in a low pay off outcome.
So far, the literature has focused on the notion that incentives to strategically bias is
from the expected outcome of a provision tournament. Burton (2010) examines strategic
bias as instead trying to manipulate the value of one attribute within the choice exper-
iment. Burton runs a two-stage DCE concerning university housing. In the first stage,
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subjects are asked to make choices according to their preferences, providing unbiased
parameter estimates. In the second stage, subjects are informed that they will be re-
warded for their ability to distort the values of certain attributes. Using a conditional
logit model, Burton estimates the marginal utilities in the first phase as well as in the
second phase. Bias is measured as the difference in choice probabilities for simulated
scenarios. Despite respondents not knowing the mechanism by which the DCE choices
will be used to elicit values for the different attributes, individuals are able to manipulate
the choice probabilities through their biased choices in the second stage.
A common element of the literature examining strategic bias in a DCE, using home-
grown or induced value experiments, is the random selection of one choice set to be
binding (except from Vossler and Evans (2009) who present a binding one-shot dichoto-
mous choice and Burton (2010) who ask respondents to distort parameter values though
their choices.). This differs from how choice experiments are used in the real world. Sin-
gle sets are not treated as an individual tournament; rather agencies are provided with
results and values based on all choices. Additionally, subjects are likely to interpret the
repetitive nature of the choice experiment to imply some aggregation of preferences from
all questions (Vossler et al., 2012).
The literature provides a foundation for when strategic bias might occur. Respon-
dents who are likely to strategise are those who (i) believe the survey is influential in
deciding the provision outcome; (ii) have an expectation on the likelihood of the provi-
sion outcomes being implemented; and (iii) are better off not behaving truthfully. We
consider all these elements in our experimental design. Furthermore, we investigate the
strategic agent under plausible conditions of how DCEs may be used to inform the de-
cision making process. We contribute to the literature by inspecting the vulnerability
of DCEs to strategic bias under the assumption a provisioning agency will use all of a
subjects’ responses and an agent will expect some aggregation of preferences to inform
the provision outcome. We first elicit choices and outcomes under truthful preference rev-
elation conditions and compare them to choices made when information on the likelihood
of the provision outcomes being implemented creates a scenario where respondents must
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choose: continue revealing truthfully and likely end up with a “bad” provision outcome
or deviate in the hopes that by doing so, the “bad” provision outcome is out favoured by
a second best outcome.
Section 3 explains how the experiment builds upon the existing literature with an
induced value choice experiment to determine the provision outcome.
3 Experimental Design and Testable Hypotheses
Our experimental design deviates from previous studies in three main aspects. First,
we explore strategic bias in choice experiments using a predetermined set of three possible
provision outcomes. Establishing the provision outcomes prior to the DCE differs from
Collins and Vossler (2009) and Carson et al. (2015) who randomly choose one choice set
to be binding. We assume the provision outcomes are a predetermined set such that
we do not rely on the statistical design to determine which bundles of attributes make
up the possible outcomes. Additionally, we emulate a field DCE where it is reasonable
that respondents would assume only a finite set of provision outcomes are ever being
considered by decision makers. For example, decision makers could be deciding between
high, medium or low development options (e.g. wind farm development, housing options,
etc.).
Second, we use all the preference information collected by the choice experiment.
Consider a development project where the DCE will be administered to elicit preferences
for attributes of the development, which decision makers will then use to decide the level
of development that should be implemented. In our experiment, a respondent will be
asked a series of trade off questions involving a number of attributes. Those trade offs
will be analysed to identify the values held for the attributes. Based on those values, we
will calculate the probability of preferring each of the possible provision outcomes for the
individual. Of the three possible provision outcomes, the one with the highest probability
will be chosen, hence a plurality provision rule. The payment to the respondent will
depend on which option is selected.
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Third, respondents are given information on the the likelihood of each provision option
being delivered. As previously mentioned, this emulates the case when individuals have a
general idea about their community’s preferences through opinion polls, market research,
media outlets, etc.4 In the case of three provision outcomes, each respondent has a first,
second and third best outcome. When given information that suggests one’s first best
outcome has the lowest probability of being implemented, a respondent will have incentive
to switch to target the second best outcome. Thus, the incentive to misrepresent one’s
preferences is a direct result of receiving information on the probabilistic outcome of the
different provision outcomes.
Previous studies by Collins and Vossler (2009) and Carson et al. (2015) offer no infor-
mation to respondents on others’ preferences, they simply suggest that others may have
differing values. Their approach allows for strategic behaviour to manifest, but it relies on
two assumptions. First, that an individual will expect the values of others to be different
than their own; and second, that these expectations will be profiled such that it diverts
them from representing their true preferences. Additionally, without the respondent hav-
ing explicit information on others’ preferences, the researcher cannot hypothesize as to
the direction of the bias, should there be one. In our study, we provide respondents with
the likelihood of the provision outcomes being implemented which will also be taken into
consideration when determining the provision outcome. The likelihoods are presented
as probabilities that each provision outcome will be the most preferred; for example,
Option A has a 50% chance of being preferred by others. In order for a respondent to
misrepresent their preferences, it must be the case that their most preferred outcome has
little chance of winning (Scheufele and Bennett, 2012). This allows us to test whether, in
the expectation of an unfavourable outcome, respondents switch to target a non-demand
revealing option.
4This has been shown in the voting literature where public opinion can be inferred through the media,
but also through conversations with friends, speeches, or the actions of public figures (Gunther, 1998).
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3.1 Experimental Design
We now derive the experimental setup more formally. Consider three provision out-
comes B = b1, b2, b3 that make up the different provision outcomes. Each outcome bk is
composed of attributes X = x1, x2, x3 indexed i. An outcome bk, will be composed of
attribute levels xki. Each agent n receives an induced value for each provision outcome
bk denoted as Vk,n. Table I outlines the profiles of the three possible outcomes.
Insert Table I Here
Each provision is composed of specific attribute levels. Given a simple plurality provi-
sion rule, strategic bias manifests when an agent anticipates their most preferred outcome
to be unlikely to win given the likelihood of the provision outcomes being implemented.
To illustrate this, suppose we have a sample of N agents. Within N agents, there exists
different types of people with heterogeneous preferences for outcomes B. Consider the
simplest case with two different types of agents, labelled Type I and Type II. Type I indi-
viduals have preference ordering b3 > b2 > b1, while Type II individuals have preference
ordering b1 > b2 > b3.
The expected probability of any one outcome bk being most preferred is Pr(bk). Blais
and Nadeau (1996) argue that there are two factors that will increase the probability
that an agent will behave strategically. The first concerns the relative intensity of one’s
preference ranking. The closer one’s preference is between the first and second best option
and the further one’s preference is between the second and third best option, the greater
a respondent’s probability of behaving strategically. The second factor is regarding the
expected probability of each option winning. The larger the difference is between the
probability of one’s first and second best option winning and the smaller the difference
is between the probability of one’s second and third best option winning, the greater the
probability of strategic voting.
For example, if the expected probability of the final provision outcome is Pr(b3) >
Pr(b2) > Pr(b1) then Type II respondents have incentive to behave strategically: their
worst option is the most likely outcome, while their first best option is least likely to
“win”. Assuming the probability between Pr(b2) and Pr(b1) is large and the probability
11
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between Pr(b3) and Pr(b2) is small, a Type II respondent has the incentive to behave
strategically.5 In this case, a respondent is faced with a high probability of receiving a
bad outcome and therefore has incentive to target their second best outcome, b2.
6
In a simple voting exercise, a strategic Type II respondent would simply cast a vote for
their second best option, b2. However, our experiment emulates the realistic environment
where a DCE is administered to advise on a predetermined set of provision outcomes.
First, respondents are given a DCE of C choice sets and asked to select their preferred
option in each choice set. The agency will establish the marginal utility estimates β for
all attributes in X through a conditional logit model. Second, the β utilities will be used
to calculate the logit probabilities for B. Whichever provision is probabilistically most
preferred, will be implemented.
In this experimental design an agent can only indirectly influence the provision out-
come by revealing preference for the attributes seen in the DCE. In Collins and Vossler
(2009) and Carson et al. (2015) respondents can switch from a first best to a second best
alternative in an individual choice set to reveal preference for a different provision out-
come. In our set up, choice sets do not contain actual provision possibilities, but solely
attributes, attributes which happen to make up the provision outcomes. In order to shift
the provision outcome in their favour, respondents must devise attribute based decision
rules based on the composition of the provision outcome they are targetting. The DCE
will advise on which provision outcome, from the predetermined set, is most preferred
and hence provided. Exhibiting strategic bias in this experiment is much more difficult
than in the experiments of Collins and Vossler (2009) and Carson et al. (2015) as (i) it
is not a simple voting exercise; (ii) our provision rule incorporates the repeated nature
of DCEs; and, (iii) the unlabelled DCE implies decision rules must be attribute based in
order to shift the provision outcome.
5According to Blais and Nadeau (1996), we also need to assume that the utility difference between
b2 and b1 is small, while the utility difference between b2 and b3 is large.
6It can be argued that in anticipation of Type II respondents behaving strategically, Type I respon-
dents will retaliate. However, for simplicity we do not explore this possibility and focus on whether Type
II respondents will act strategically under these conditions.
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3.2 Testable Hypotheses
This experimental design is to test four main hypotheses.7 The first hypothesis con-
cerns the robustness of the experiment. We want to first confirm that when agents expect
to receive a bad outcome from the final provision outcomes, we see a switch to the second
best outcome. To do so, we consider control and treatment groups where the control
group have no priors about others’ preferences and therefore have no incentive to misrep-
resent. In the treatment groups, respondents are given the probabilistic outcome of the
final provisions being implemented. Therefore, we can compare outcomes and strategies
in the presence and absence of information that creates incentives to misrepresent one’s
preferences.
We consider that strategic bias is likely to occur when an agent’s most preferred
option is least likely to be the provision “winner”; therefore, the information given to the
treatment group regarding the likelihood of the provision outcomes being implemented
reflects this. We induce agents to have preference ordering b1 > b2 > b3. Respondents in
the treatment group are given information on the preferred outcome of N-1 agents through
provision outcome probabilities, such that Pr(b3) > Pr(b2) > Pr(b1) . The probabilities
of the second and third best outcomes are close, such that the second best outcome is
a realistic contender. Similarly, the probability of the first best outcome is small, such
that the probability of it being implemented is negligible. In this case, respondents in
the treatment groups can anticipate an unfavourable outcome b3 as the likely winner,
and will switch to target the second best option. Agents in the control group, who do
not have information on the outcome probabilities, will more likely target the first best
option.
H1: Significantly more respondents in the treatment group will target the
second best option than in the control group.
Our second hypothesis concerns whether the relative difference in Vk,n between out-
comes in B, affects an individual’s willingness to switch to their second best outcome.
7The following hypotheses will compare respondents targeting the first and second best outcomes.
This is because it is never in one’s interest to vote for one’s least preferred outcome (Collins and Vossler,
2009) and only a small percentage of our sample targeted the third and in our case, worst option.
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Recall Blais and Nadeau (1996) who state that two differences in utility matter for a
strategic agent. First, the utility difference between the first and second best option and
second, the utility difference between the second and third best option. As this is an
induced value experiment, the utility for each option is expected to be the given values
Vk,n. Our first treatment group has values for the first, second and third best outcomes of
£5, £4 and £0, respectively. We refer to this treatment as Treatment(0,4,5). In order to
test the mental anchoring effects of the given values for the outcomes in B, we include an
additional treatment, referred to as Treatment(0,3,6) whose values for the three provision
outcomes are £6, £3 and £0. Within Treatment(0,3,6), respondents face a higher pay
off for the first best option and a slightly smaller pay off for the second best option.8 We
hypothesis that even when the difference in pay offs between one’s first and second best
option, d12, increases, respondents will still target the second best option. We selected
a range of values for Vk such that strategic behaviour is expected to manifest in both
treatment groups.
H2: As d12 increases, respondents in Treatment (0,4,5) and Treatment (0,3,6)
are equally as likely to behave strategically.
Our third hypothesis considers the decision rules taken by respondents. Respondents
receive pay off for each of the final provision contenders Vk,n, but not for the individual
attributes within bk. Respondents have to conjecture how the agency will use their
responses in the DCE to implement one of the outcomes, a common behavioural problem
of choice experiments (Carson and Groves, 2007). Individuals must therefore define a
decision rule to use within the DCE to reveal preference for bk by making tradeoffs
between x1, x2 and x3. One way for respondents to interpret this task is to choose a
simple decision rule based on the attribute composition of the desired outcome. We
consider it likely that given the complexity of the task they face, that individuals will
use “fast-and-frugal heuristics” (Mousavi et al., 2016). At its most simple, this reduces
to a lexicographic decision rule. Lexicographic decision rules are one way for respondents
8Within each group, all individuals see the same values for each outcome. Such that V ck , V
t(0,4,5)
k ,
and V
t(0,3,6)
k is the same across individuals in the control group, Treatment(0,4,5) and Treatment(0,3,6).
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to simplify the task, while making reasonable choices and solving the problem presented
in the experiment. To implement this, respondents must choose one attribute that most
clearly distinguishes their target outcome from the other two outcomes. For example, if
we consider an agent who wants to reveal preference for bk=2, then we must examine all the
outcome-attribute combinations and choose the attribute where x2i > xki for k = 1, 3, or
x2i < xki for k = 1, 3, holds. These can be referred to as a maximum/minimum attribute
xi strategy. Respondents targeting their first best outcome and respondents targeting
their second best outcome will exhibit different decision strategies on attribute xi.
H3: An agent targeting the second best outcome b2 will use a maximum(minimum)
strategy on xi more frequently than an agent targeting the first best outcome
b1 is using a maximum(minimum) strategy on xi.
Our final hypothesis compares the stated objective of individuals with the choice prob-
ability predictions found through the conditional logit model. We ask respondents after
the DCE to state the outcome they were trying to reveal as their preferred outcome.9
In this regard, we will observe a respondent n wanting the provision outcome bk making
choices cn,k in C choices sets. We estimate a respondent’s preference parameters via a
random utility model on their DCE choices and find the predicted probabilistic ranking
of contenders in B. Based on Lancaster (1966) and McFadden (1974) we use a conditional
logit model to estimate the marginal utilities for xi. We estimate the conditional logit
model for the aggregate sample, as well as for sub-sample of individuals based on their
stated objective, such that all respondents targeting bk consist of one sub-sample. Using
the parameter estimates, we calculate the logit probabilities for each outcome. We hy-
pothesize that conditional on which outcome bk an agent n is targeting and the choices
9We have no reason to believe that when answering this question, a respondent would respond strate-
gically by stating an objective other than the objective they were targeting in the DCE. If a respondent
believes this question will have no effect on the provision outcome, then there is no incentive to lie.
However, even if a respondent believes this question will influence the provision outcome, there is still
no incentive to lie. Consider a respondent in the control. If a respondent has preference ordering
b1 > b2 > b3, there is no logical reason to state they were trying to reveal preference for b2 or b3 in case
b2 or b3 is then provided. In the treatment, the same logic holds for a respondent revealing preference
for b1. In the case where the respondents has made the decision to be strategic and target the second
best outcome, b2 , then stating b1 or b3 in this question who negate that effort.
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ck,n they made, the estimated choice probability for outcome bk will be largest.
10
H4: Given that a respondent is targeting the provision outcome bk, the choice
probability calculated ex post for outcome bk will exceed the choice probability
for bh ∀ h 6= k. Such that, Pr(bk|ck,n) > Pr(bh|ck,n) ∀ h 6= k.
3.3 Experiment participants and procedures
The sample consisted of one hundred and thirty individuals. They were all under-
graduates, postgraduates and staff at the University of Manchester. Each respondent
answered twelve choice sets, with three possible alternatives in each choice set. The DCE
survey was designed and implemented in Sawtooth Software using a balanced overlap
design with five different blocks. Individuals participated one at a time on a laptop via a
computer assisted personal interview (CAPI). Respondents were told that their responses
to the choice sets would be used to determine the experimental outcome between three
possible outcomes. Below we describe the treatments and experimental procedure, the
exact instructions can be found in Appendix C.
3.3.1 Treatments
The experiment was conducted in two waves. In the first wave, respondents were ran-
domly allocated to a control or treatment group (referred to as Treatment(0,4,5)). Thirty
individuals were in the control and thirty-nine individuals were in Treatment(0,4,5). In
both groups, the values for the provision outcomes were £5, £4 and £0 for respondents
first, second and third best outcomes. Respondents allocated to the treatment received in-
formation about the provision outcome probabilities, such that Pr(b3) > Pr(b2) > Pr(b1)
was 50%, 45% and 5% respectively. These probabilities are fixed and are a feature of
the experiment controlled by the research. However, it was explained to participants
that these probabilities represented the preferences of others, to give the illusion that
respondents were part of a pool. We varied the sample size of ‘others’ from which these
10The effect of strategic switchers on the predicted provision outcome was extensively investigated in
simulation work prior to conducting the lab experiment. One example of this simulation exercise can be
shown in Appendix A.
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probabilities were found. The stated sample was a random number between 10 and 20.
These values were selected such that each respondent represents between 5% and 10% of
the overall sample.11 We propose this to be a small enough sample that an individual
will believe they can increase the probability of their second most preferred outcome to
be the largest, but a large enough sample such that they believe they cannot increase the
probability of their first best option to be the provision winner.12 In actuality respon-
dent’s choices in the treatment groups were pooled with a fixed simulated sample of 10
agents whose predicted outcome over the three contenders was 50%, 45% and 5%.
Additionally, as mentioned in Section 3.1, the chosen probabilities reflect the case
when the difference between the second and third best option is small, while the difference
between one’s first and second best is substantial. In this case, the worst outcome (i.e.
the outcome that paid £0) is predicted to be the provision winner, the best outcome
is unlikely to win, while the second best outcome is a serious contender. Given the
conditions of the information on the provision outcome probabilities, a respondent will
have incentive to behave strategically and switch to target their second best outcome. In
the instructions, respondents in the treatment groups were given the size of the sample
and the provision outcome probabilities. The experimental set-up in the control group
were given no information on the provision outcome probabilities and the instructions
used language to imply that only their individual responses were being considered and
no other preferences would be taken into account in deciding the provision outcome.
In the second wave of the experiment, we changed the induced values for the first,
second and worst provision outcomes to be £6, £3 and £0, respectively. In this sec-
ond treatment group (Treatment(0,3,6)), all respondents were given information about
the provision outcome probabilities. This differs from the first wave as we do not
11There is anecdotal evidence that in collecting data for DCE studies, communities become aware of
the study and discuss (via Internet forums, word of mouth, etc.) the merit and overall objective of
the study. Thus it may not be that an individual needs to believe themself to be able to influence the
provision, but a constituency who collectively agrees to bias their answers to attain a different provision
result.
12Blamey (1998) argue that a respondent’s willingness to provide positive WTP for a contingent
valuation study is also contingent on a respondent’s belief regarding the size of the population. Therefore,
we chose to vary the stated size of the population (N-1). We use a multinomial regression to test whether
there are any effects of varying the stated N-1 on respondents choice of provision outcome. We found no
such effects. Results available upon request.
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need an additional control group who does not see the probabilities. The results from
Treatment(0,3,6) can be compared to the control from the first wave as well as Treat-
ment(0,4,5).13 Treatment(0,3,6) saw information that the provision outcome probabilities
were Pr(b3) = 50% > Pr(b2) = 45% > Pr(b1) = 5%, such that the experimental set up
was exactly that of Treatment(0,4,5).
3.3.2 Experimental procedures
In order to simplify the cognitive burden of the task, we chose to label the provision
outcomes and attributes. We selected three possible provision outcomes: Leisure Centre,
Community Park or Market. These outcomes were composed of three attributes: roads,
jobs and trees.14 We deliberately have all ‘positive’ attributes, such that there is no cost
attribute. This is first because we are not giving respondents any initial balance with
which they could use to ‘pay’ for the provision outcome. Second, any inclusion of a price
attribute would conflate the task at hand with making trade-offs between an alternative’s
attributes and the associate cost.
The DCE would lead to one of the development options being implemented; however,
within the choice sets themselves, the alternatives are unlabelled.15 The different provi-
sion outcome profiles are shown in Table II. Only respondents in Treatment(0,4,5) and
Treatment(0,3,6) saw information on the probabilities of each outcome.
Insert Table II Here
Respondents saw the final provision outcomes and the associated monetary values
prior to answering the DCE. A reminder was given under each choice set as to the
13We note that different monetary pay offs in a control treatment with £0, £3, and £6 may have
differed from the control with £0, £4 and £5 payoffs. However, one’s decision to deviate from the first
best outcome can only be reduced when the first best outcome payoff is increased (from £5 to £6) and
the second best outcome payoff is decreased (from £4 to £3). Therefore, if any differences are observed
between Treatment(0,3,6) and control(0,4,5) then they would likely be present, if not even more apparent,
between Treatment(0,3,6) and a control(0,3,6).
14A variety of different attributes were considered, including generic attributes such as different colour
buttons, alphabetic characters, etc. Initial trials indicated that using such arbitrary generic attributes
increased the cognitive challenge for respondents who had to translate their target provision outcome into
an attribute based decision rule. Hence the use of the more intuitive jobs/roads/trees. We acknowledge
that this creates the risk of inadvertently introducing ‘real’ preferences into the choices, something we
tested for and failed to detect in pilot debrief questions.
15The experiment instructions as well as an example choice set can be seen in Appendix C.
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attribute levels in each possible provision outcome, the monetary payoff, and the provision
outcome probabilities (only for the treatment groups). All respondents are expected to
have a preference ordering of M > CP > LC based on the induced values for each of
the possible provision outcomes. Respondents received information that the agency will
evaluate how much they like/dislike the attributes based on their responses to the twelve
choice sets; they will then translate this into which provision option is most preferred.
There are three components to this experiment. First, respondents must understand
the relative value of the attribute levels for roads, jobs and trees in the three labelled
provision contenders. Second, they must decide which option to target based on Vk as
well as Pr(bk) for the treatment groups. This involves targeting one’s first best option
or understanding that the second best option has a higher chance of being the provision
outcome. Third, respondents need to develop a decision rule based on jobs, roads and
trees to implement in the unlabelled DCE, that will reveal preference for their target
provision outcome.
After the choice sets, respondents answered subsequent follow up questions. These
included asking participants which provision outcome they were targeting through their
choices, their strategy during the DCE, whether or not they considered the provision
outcome probabilities (only for the treatment groups) and how difficult they found the
task. As respondents played one at a time, payment needed to be immediate. Therefore,
after the responses had been recorded, a conditional logit model was estimated using R
and the subsequent choice probabilities were calculated for the final provision (R Core
Team, 2013). Respondents saw the probabilistic outcome of the provision based on their
individual responses. For those in the treatment groups, R collated the individual’s
responses with those of the simulated sample to emulate the environment explained to
respondents. All participants received £3 for their participation and an additional amount
according to which outcome was estimated to have the largest choice probability.16
16This experiment received ethical approval in 2016 from the University of Manchester Research Ethics
Committee 6, reference number 16275. It was funded by the University of Manchester School of Social
Sciences.
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4 Results
The follow up questions regarding strategies and targets within the choice experiment
included explicitly asking respondents which provision outcome they were targeting. In
the case of the treatment groups, they were asked whether they considered the information
on the provision outcome probabilities. Table III shows the stated objectives for all
individuals in each treatment. Respondents in the treatment groups are subdivided into
whether or not they reported having considered the information on the provision outcome
probabilities.
Insert Table III Here
Across the control and treatment groups, respondents indicated targeting both the
first, second and even the third best outcomes. We define “First best” respondents
(FBR) as the participants who targeted the Market, i.e. the provision contender which
provided the largest monetary payoff. “Second best” respondents (SBR) are defined as
all participants who targeted the Community Park, i.e. the provision contender which
provided the second largest monetary payoff. In Treatment(0,4,5), 49% of respondents
indicated having considered the information on the provision outcome probabilities, while
44% did not take into account this information. In Treatment(0,3,6), 34% of respondents
reported taking into consideration the provision outcome probabilities while 49% did not.
4.1 Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1 states that respondents will switch to a second best outcome when faced
with an expected unfavourable provision outcome. In other words, considering the voting
behaviour of other respondents may be signs of strategic bias (Vossler et al., 2012). Look-
ing at Table III, 57% of individuals in the control group, which did not receive information
on the provision outcome probabilities, targeted the first best provision option and 27%
targeted the second best option despite receiving less payment. This is consistent with
previous studies which find that even under the simplest incentive structure, participants
deviate from payoff maximising choices due to measurement error and/or cognitive bur-
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den (e.g Luchini and Watson (2014), Carson et al. (2015)). In Treatment(0,4,5), 44%
target the first best option and 44% of respondents target the second best provision op-
tion. In Treatment(0,3,6), 39% and 49% of respondents reported targeting the first and
second best outcomes respectively. Hypothesis 1 states that respondents in the treatment
groups will target the second best option more than respondents in the control. Com-
paring first SBR respondents in the control group (8/30) to SBR in Treatment(0,4,5)
(17/39), a non-parametric Fishers Exact Test does not indicate that significantly more
respondents are targeting the second best option in the treatment (FE p-value 0.207).
Comparing the SBR in the control group (8/30) to SBR in the Treatment(0,3,6) (30/61),
we find evidence at the 5% level that more respondents are targeting the second best
outcome (FE 0.045).
However, only respondents who take into account the information on the provision
outcome probabilities have incentive to target the second best provision contender. In
that case, we examine the subset of respondents who considered the probabilities (49% in
Treatment(0,4,5) and 34% in Treatment(0,3,6)). Comparing SBR in the control (8/30) to
SBR in Treatment(0,4,5) conditional on having taken into account the provision outcome
probabilities (12/17), significantly more respondents will target the second best option
in the treatment than in the control group (FE p-value 0.017). Similarly, conditional
on considering the probabilities, significantly more respondents target the second best in
Treatment(0,3,6) (15/19) than the control (FE p-value 0.003).
4.2 Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 states that individuals in Treatment(0,3,6) will be equally as likely to
switch to the second best option as respondents in Treatment(0,4,5). Table III shows that
in Treatment(0,3,6), 34% of participants said they took into consideration the provision
outcome probabilities, while 49% did not consider this information. Recall that a strategic
individual will target their second best outcome because they take into consideration the
provision outcome probabilities. Therefore, fifteen out of the nineteen respondents who
considered the information in Treatment(0,3,6) can be categorized as strategic, while
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twelve out of seventeen from Treatment(0,4,5) fit the criteria. Using a Fisher’s Exact
Test we fail to reject equality among these proportions (FE p-value 0.706). This suggests
that increasing the pay off difference between the first and second best option d12, does
not change the probability that an individual will switch to target their second best
outcome when faced with a likely unfavourable provision outcome.17
4.3 Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3 concerns choice strategies. As described in Section 3.1, respondents
are faced with a difficult task and need to derive a choice strategy that is based on the
attributes of their provision target. Hypothesis 3 is therefore two fold. First, we must
establish individual behavioural decision rules. Second, we look at whether the decision
rules across respondents with different objectives, differ. In other words, as there is no
way to determine whether what a respondent says they are doing (i.e. through the self
reported statement at the end) with what they are actually doing, we can determine if
decision strategies are consistent with their reported target.
We expect FBR to be making lexicographic choices on the attribute that distinguishes
the Market from the other two provision outcomes, in this case attributes jobs or roads.
Recall that individuals targeting an outcome are expected to look for the attribute that
most distinguishes the target outcome from the other two provision contenders. For
FBR, this may either be the attribute jobs or the attribute roads as the Market has
the highest provision of jobs and the lowest provision of roads compared to the Leisure
Centre or Community Park. The attribute jobs satisfies the maximum attribute criteria:
xM,jobs > xh,jobs for h = LC and h = CP. In addition, roads satisfies the minimum
attribute criteria: xM,roads < xh,roads for h = LC and h = CP.
For SBR, the attribute trees satisfies the maximum attribute criteria while jobs sat-
isfies the minimum attribute criteria. The Community Park has the highest provision of
trees relative to the Leisure Centre or Market, such that xCP,trees > xh,trees for h = LC
17We note that given that these samples sizes are small, with 30 in the control, 39 in Treatment(0,4,5)
and 61 in Treatment(0,3,6), only very large effects are likely to be statistically significant. A larger
sample would potentially invalidate this finding.
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and h = M. The provision of trees is 7, 9 and 20 for the Leisure Centre, Market and
Community Park, respectively. In addition, jobs satisfies the minimum attribute criteria:
xCP,jobs < xh,roads for h = LC and h = M.
Across all FBR, we plot the number of times they used a maximum jobs, maximum
trees, minimum roads and minimum jobs decision rule out of the twelve choice sets.18
This is presented in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Lexicographic choices by attribute – First best respondents (average out of 12
is indicated)
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The mean number of choices characterised by the maximum jobs, maximum trees,
minimum roads and minimum job decision rule is 7.8, 6, 3.7 and 0.5 respectively. Using
a Mann Whitney U test for equality of the distributions, we reject that the distributions
are the same between maximum jobs (7.8) and maximum trees (6) choices (MW p-
18Appendix B outlines the number of times out of twelve that a choice set includes a choice set where
the lexicographic strategies overlap.
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value 0.000) and between maximum jobs (7.8) and minimum road (3.7) or minimum job
(0.5) choices (MW p-value 0.000, 0.000) This suggests that FBR are using a maximum
lexicographic strategy on the attribute jobs more than one on roads or trees. Figure 2
illustrates the lexicographic choices for each attribute across SBR.
Figure 2: Lexicographic choices by attribute – Second best respondents (average out of
12 is indicated)
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The mean number of lexicographic choices characterised by maximum jobs, maximum
trees, minimum jobs and minimum roads is 6.8, 7.6, 4.2 and 1.4 out of 12, respectively.
We reject the hypothesis that the distributions are the same for maximum trees (7.6) and
maximum jobs (6.8) as well as for maximum trees (7.6) and minimum jobs (4.2) (MW
p-value 0.000, 0.000). We also reject that the distributions are the same for maximum
trees (7.6) and minimum roads (1.4) (MW p-value 0.000). Targeting the second best
provision outcome suggests that respondents choose lexicographically on the attribute
trees, more than on the attribute jobs or roads. This further suggests that respondents
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are using decision rules that are a direct result of the composition of the final alternatives.
Having concluded that SBR are implementing a decision rule on trees more often
than any other strategy, we question whether SBR are more likely to use the maximum
tree decision rule than FBR. Using the Fishers Exact Test for unmatched data, we reject
equality and find that SBR are using a decision rule on trees (7.6) more than FBR
(6) (FE p-value 0.000). Similarly, FBR are using a maximum job decision rule (7.8)
more than SBR (4.2) (FE p-value 0.026). This further confirms that choice strategies are
consistent with the provision contenders and are significantly different across respondents
with different provision objectives.
4.4 Hypothesis 4
Hypothesis 4 concerns whether the predicted choice probabilities for the provision
contenders are in line with the stated objectives of respondents from whose choices the
probabilities are estimated. We first estimate a conditional logit model to obtain the
parameter estimates β for the three attributes using all the DCE responses. We run a
conditional logit model for the aggregate sample using all 130 responses and collect the
marginal utilities for the attributes βA, as well as for each sub-sample of respondents
based on their stated provision objective. Respondents are grouped solely by their stated
objective bk and therefore we estimate marginal utilities for each group of respondents
targeting the Market (βM), Community Park (βCP ), Leisure Centre (βLC) and those
unsure (βU). These marginal utilities can be seen in Appendix B. After estimating
the marginal utilities, we calculate the logit choice probabilities for the three provision
contenders. By doing this we can examine the indirect effect choice strategies have on the
predicted provision outcome. Table IV outlines the choice probabilities for the aggregate
sample as well as for each sub-sample of individuals based on their stated objective.19
Insert Table IV Here
The results in Table IV show the predicted outcome given the responses ck,n in the
DCE. Under a plurality provision rule, both FBR and SBR have delivered on their stated
19Appendix B shows a simulated outcome of the choice probabilities if respondents were to choose
randomly within the DCE.
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task. Respondents targeting the Market (βM), have a probability of preferring the Mar-
ket by 47%. Respondents targeting the Community Park (βCP ) have a probability of
preferring the Community Park with 56% probability. Based on their stated provision
objective and their choice decision rules, both FBR and SBR would receive the desired
outcome under a plurality provision rule. Overall, 45% of respondents targeted the first
best outcome, while 42% indicated targeting the second best outcome. Despite more
respondents preferring the first best outcome, using the aggregate sample (βA) we find a
predicted preference of the Market to be 39% while the Community Park is most preferred
with 43%. Under a plurality decision rule, the second best outcome would be provided.
This suggests that strategic bias could lead to a provision outcome that differs from the
unconditionally preferred outcome.
5 Conclusion
The experimental results reported here indicate that significant numbers of respon-
dents are behaving strategically. Despite the complexity required to translate targeting
one’s second best outcome into an attribute based decision rule, we find that many respon-
dents are able to do so. They comprehend the payoff scheme, understand the information
about the relative likelihoods associated with the provision outcomes and translate that
information into an attribute based decision rules which differs from those they would
employ to target their first best outcome. This would be much simpler for them if the
choice sets in the DCE were labelled. In our unlabelled experiment the work involved to
strategically bias results was considerably more demanding.
Of the one hundred individuals in the treatment groups, we categorize 27% as acting
strategically, such that they report considering the final provision outcome probabilities
and resolve to switch to target their second best outcome. We find that even though
respondents are using lexicographic decision rules in less than 100% of the choice sets,
the choice probabilities estimated on their data reflect their stated provision target.
The provision outcome probabilities were constant in both treatment groups. They
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were designed to convey that respondents’ first best outcome was unlikely to occur and
that the second best might be delivered– it was a serious contender. This combination
incentivised respondents to switch choice behaviour to target their second best outcome.
The belief that their choices can have an effect on the provision outcome is a probable
requirement before a person will exert the mental effort to adjust their choice behaviour.
Additional requirements, identified at the outset of the paper, are that the respondent
believes the DCE will affect which outcome will be provided (over a discrete set of alter-
natives) and that the respondent has expectations about the relative likelihood of those
provision options being selected. We note that in field choice experiments, the substan-
tive case study may not be one where the likelihood of different provision outcomes is
well known by communities or is clearly defined. A better understanding of the condi-
tions under which people will (not) make the effort to adjust their choice behaviour is
warranted; for example by varying the priors the respondents have about the probabili-
ties associated with each of the provision outcomes or by introducing uncertainty on the
actual provision outcomes. Respondents may use the DCE in order to affect provision
outcomes they believe are under consideration, but the true set may differ. In this case,
the DCE would still be susceptible to strategic bias and yield unreliable estimations of
preferences. As strategic misrepresentation is a direct result from unfavourable priors
regarding the preferences of others, field studies should be aware of how opinion polls on
current issues may bias respondent choices and whether information can be given prior
to the task to combat those priors to elicit truthful responses.
This study shows that strategic bias is a potential issue in choice experiments. How-
ever, we note that the task required a significant degree of cognitive effort which not all
respondents chose to exert, either because they were not bothered or because they did not
understand. As the sample was university staff and students, we anticipate the former as
an explanation. The cognitive effort required to deviate from one’s true preference under
the complexity of choice experiments may be an issue in the real world. It would depend
on how much a respondent cares about the outcome, the work involved, and their percep-
tion regarding the effect their effort would have on the overall outcome. Further research
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may extrapolate the experimental findings to the field. Additional research on com-
plexity of the choice experiment would advise whether design complexity (i.e. increased
attributes, choice sets, alternatives per choice set, etc.) can address this behavioural in-
efficiency without compromising statistical efficiency. Additionally, our study eliminated
the burden of cost; research which reintroduces the cost attribute would further shed
light on respondents’ willingness to strategically bias and its effect on value estimates.
The implications of this research are that individuals may not respond truthfully in
choice experiments if they (i) envision the choice experiment as potentially affecting the
provision outcome; (ii) have expectations of the final provision options; and, (iii) have
an expectation of the liklihood of the provision outcomes being implemented. Carson
and Groves (2007) indicate that a DCE must be considered a consequential mechanism
by respondents if the results are to be used in economic analysis. The results reported
here suggest that under certain, plausible conditions, the strategic misrepresentation of
preferences is a direct consequence of that consequentiality requirement.
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Table I: Final provision outcome profiles
Provision Outcomes
Attribute b1 b2 b3
x1 x11 x21 x31
x2 x12 x22 x32
x3 x13 x23 x33
Value Vk=1,n Vk=2,n Vk=3,n
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Table II: Final provision outcome profiles and induced values
Contender
Attribute Leisure Centre (LC) Community Park (CP) Market (M)
Roads 4 3 2
Jobs 5 4 8
Trees 7 20 9
Value
Control £0 £4 £5
Treatment(0,4,5) £0 £4 £5
Treatment(0,3,6) £0 £3 £6
Probability 50% 45% 5%
Note: Treatment(0,4,5) and Treatment (0,3,6) refer to the two treatments with pay off levels for
the three provision options of £0, £4, £5 and £0, £3, £6 respectively.
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Table III: Self reported provision target by treatment
provision Target
Group Considered Market Community Leisure I Don’t Total
Information Park Centre Know
Control - 17 (57%) 8 (27%) 2 (6%) 3 (10%) 30 (100%)
Yes 5 (26%) 12 (63%) 1 (5 %) 1 (5%) 19 (49%)
Treatment(0,4,5) No 11 (64%) 4 (24%) 1 (6%) 1 (6%) 17(44%)
I don’t know 1 (33.3%) 1 (33.3%) 0 (0%) 1 (33.3%) 3 (8%)
Total 17 (44%) 17 (44%) 2 (5%) 3 (7%) 39 (100%)
Yes 4 (19%) 15(71%) 1(5%) 1(5%) 21 (34%)
Treatment(0,3,6) No 17 (57%) 10 (33%) 2 (7%) 1 (3%) 30 (49%)
I don’t know 3 (30%) 5 (50%) 0 (0%) 2 (20%) 10 (16.3%)
Total 24 (39%) 30 (49%) 3 (5%) 4 (7%) 61(100%)
Total 58(45%) 55 (42%) 7 (5%) 10 (8%) 130 (100%)
Note: Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding. Treatment(0,4,5) and Treatment (0,3,6) refer to the
two treatments with pay off levels for the three provision options of £0, £4, £5 and £0, £3, £6 respectively.
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Table IV: Predicted choice probabilities for the final provision outcomes
Provision Outcomes
Leisure Centre Community Park Market N o indiv.
Pr(bk |βM) 20.3% 32.1% 47.5% 58
Pr(bk |βCP ) 12.4% 56.0% 31.5% 55
Pr(bk |βLC) 29.9% 37.4% 32.6% 7
Pr(bk |βU) 23.4% 32.0% 44.5% 10
Pr(bk |βA) 18.0% 42.2% 39.7% 130
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Appendices
A Strategic Simulation Exercise
Consider two types of simulated agents, Type I and Type II, who have heterogeneous
preferences.
UI = −20 ∗ x1 − 13.32 ∗ x2 + 33.33 ∗ x3 + 46.66 ∗ x4 − n
UII = −20 ∗ x1 + 8 ∗ x2 − 20 ∗ x3 + 20 ∗ x4 − n
Where  is a Gumbel distributed error term. Given these utility functions, respondents
have different preference ordering for three provision outcomes bj, bk and bm shown in
Table A.1.
Insert Table A.1 Here
For the outcomes in Table A.1, Type I agents have preference ordering bj > bk > bm
while Type II agents have preference ordering bm > bk > bj. Agents are presented with a
choice experiment, regarding attributes three discrete variables x1, x2, x3 and one dummy
variable x4. The design was created in Sawtooth Software using balanced overlap. The
DCE will ask agents to make trade offs based on attributes xi and will be used to elicit
the preference ordering of the final provision. We consider a sample of 500 agents made
up of 75% Type I agents and 25% Type II agents.
Using Monte Carlo simulations, we simulate choices to the DCE under true prefer-
ence revelation based on the utility functions, a sample of 500 agents and 500 replications.
Using the average marginal utilities found from these simulations, we predict the choice
probabilities for each provision contender. When all agents respond to the DCE truth-
fully, the predicted preference ordering is Pr(bj) > Pr(bk) > Pr(bm). Expecting an un-
favourable outcome, we turn to simulate when Type II respondents choose to target their
second best provision outcome, bk. We assume a lexicographic decision rule on the at-
tribute x2 is implemented by strategic respondents, as it satisfies the minimum/maximum
attribute rule of Hypothesis 3. The predicted choice probabilities for the three provision
contenders is shown in Table A.2.
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Insert Table A.2 Here
Again, under 0% strategic respondents, we have a predicted probability that bj is most
preferred. In this case, Type II respondents switch to target their second best outcome bk
and choose lexicographically on the attribute x2. As the sample of strategic respondents
increases, the predicted probability of the preferred outcomes change. At 10% strategic
respondents, the largest predicted probability is now for bk. Under a plurality decision
rule, Type II respondents have switched the provision outcome.
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Table A.1 provision Contenders
Provision outcomes
Attribute bj bk bm
x1 13 5 8
x2 5 11 8
x3 15 10 4
x4 1 0 1
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Table A.2 Simulated outcomes
Percent Strategic Predicted Probability
bj bk bm
0% 0.54 0.39 0.07
5% 0.48 0.44 0.08
10% 0.43 0.47 0.09
25% 0.37 0.54 0.09
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B
Table B.1 Number of choice sets with lexicographic overlaps (out of 12)
Block
1 2 3 4 5
max jobs= max trees 3 6 4 7 7
max jobs = min roads 5 5 5 4 2
max jobs = min jobs 0 0 0 0 0
max trees = min roads 6 5 5 4 4
max trees = min jobs 7 4 2 6 5
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Table B.2 Parameter estimates
Provision Outcome Target
Aggregate Market Community Park Leisure Centre Unsure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Roads -0.0033 0.0337 -0.0557 0.160∗ -0.0397
(0.0199) (0.0307) (0.0325) (0.0779) (0.0663)
Jobs 0.207∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗
(0.0103) (0.0172) (0.0160) (0.0346) (0.0322)
Trees 0.0813∗∗∗ 0.0586∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.0382 0.0339∗
(0.0054) (0.0082) (0.0093) (0.0205) (0.0168)
Observations 4680 2088 1980 252 360
N o indiv. 130 58 55 7 10
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table B.3 Provision outcomes under randomised selection in the DCE
Leisure Centre Community Park Market
Roads 3 2 2
Jobs 4 5 6
Trees 7 20 10
Choice Probabilities 0.336 0.328 0.335
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C Experiment Instructions
The following instructions show the pay offs for the control and treatment groups such
that first and second best outcomes correspond to a pay off of £5 and £4, respectively.
Respondents in Treatment(0,3,6) would have seen pay offs where the first best value is
£6 and the second best is £3.
The Choice Game
Thank you for playing The Choice Game.
You will receive £3 for your participation.
You can receive an additional amount between £0 and £5, depending on the outcome
of the game, which will be describer shortly.
Imagine that you are a citizen of Toonsville.
The local authority is going to develop a plot of land.
There are three options for the development: a leisure centre, a community park, or
a market.
Each of the three possible options differ in terms of the amount of roads, jobs and
trees they will provide, as shown here:
The local authorities decide to run a survey to inform their planning decision.
In that survey people are presented with 12 questions that look like this:
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In each question, the number of roads, jobs and trees will change.
The local authority will:
• Analyse people’s choices to determine how much they like or dislike roads, jobs and
trees.
• Use the responses to determine which of the three policies is most preferred in the
community.
Your Task
Your task in this game is to complete the survey for the local authorities.
You will make a series of choices out of three options, as shown in the example
question.
The local authorities will use your responses to determine whether the leisure centre,
community park. or market will be built.
We (i.e. the local authority) will analyse your choices and determine which project
will go ahead.
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You will be paid £3 simply for playing.
You will be paid an additional amount according to which project is found to be most
preferred based on your survey responses in this way:
• It the market is most preferred you will receive £5
• If the community park is most preferred you will receive £4.
• If the leisure centre is most preferred you will receive £0.
We are now ready for you to make your choices from the set comprising 3 options.
We will remind you when you make each choice of:
1. The three options the local authority is considering
2. The payment to you depending on which one is chosen by the local authority, using
this picture:
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(Begin choice sets)
In the treatment groups, prior to answering the twelve choice sets, respondents addi-
tionally saw:
News just in...
An opinion poll appears in the local paper.
It shows that, among the other community leaders:
• 50% prefer the leisure centre
• 45% prefer the community park
• 5% prefer the market
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We will remind you when you make each choice of:
1. The three options the local authority is considering
2. The popularity of each option among the other community leaders
3. The payment to you depending on which one is chosen by the local authority, using
this picture:
(Begin choice sets)
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Thank you for completing this questionnaire.
We will inform you which project was most preferred shortly.
First, can you please answer the following questions to the best of your ability.
1. Can you please indicate which project were you trying to increase influence over
by your choices in the survey?
• Market
• Community Park
• Leisure Centre
• None of the above. I was confused
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2. Briefly describe the strategy you took in order to influence the local authority to
increase the popularity of ‘answer from question 1’.
3. How difficult did you find the task?
• Very difficult
• Difficult
• Neutral
• Easy
• Very easy
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